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Caricatures / Cartoons
DEF: Now mostly used synonymously, the terms
caricature (from Lat. carrus > Ital. caricare, to over-
load or surcharge, and hence to exaggerate) and
cartoon (Lat. charta > Ital. carta, cartone, carton or
cardboard) denote the satirical and hyperbolical
representation of persons or societal and political
issues by graphic means. Viewed through a cul-
tural lens, the rights related to caricatures as cul-
ture have been most prominent. Caricatures can
be considered ameans for individuals, groups and
communities ‘to build their world view represent-
ing their encounter with the external forces a￿ect-
ing their lives’ (cf. CESCR, General Comment no.
21, 2009). O￿ering, in thewords of SigmundFreud,
a means to unmask disingenuous grandeur and to
disparage the powerful, caricatures have been an
important element in Western political discourse
since at least the 18th century (Fuchs, 1921; Lange-
meyer, 1984). Cartoonists such as James Gillray,
Honoré Daumier, Thomas Nast, David Low or,
more recently, Kevin Kallaugher have provided
poignant commentary on current a￿airs; satirical
periodicals such as Simplicissimus, Punch, La Ca-
ricature, or Charlie Hébdo have a long tradition as
well.
More recently, however, caricatures have also
been perceived as a threat to culture, namely in
the context of lampooning faiths and religious
figures. Both aspects – caricatures as an important
means of criticism and as an attack on religion –
have been at evidence in the so-calledMohammed
cartoons controversy that originated in a series
of drawings published in a Danish newspaper in
2005.
INSTR: As an expressive medium, caricatures
are protected by international and regional provi-
sions on freedom of speech; on the national level,
they may enjoy – often congruent – constitutional
protection as works of art (e.g. in Article 5(3) of
the German Grundgesetz). Article 19 ICCPR, which
safeguards the right to ‘impart information and
ideas of all kinds in the form of art, or through any
other media’, and Article 10 ECHR, which protects
‘information and ideas’, also cover caricatures,
as does the pertinent provision in the American
Convention on Human Rights (Article 13(1)). The
di￿ering wordings in other regional instruments,
however, already indicate varying scopes of pro-
tected expressions, possibly hinting at cultural
di￿erences as well: Article 9(2) ACHPR protects
the right to express one’s opinions ‘within the
law’; according to the Cairo Declaration, ‘every-
one shall have the right to express his opinion
freely in such manner as would not be contrary
to the principles of the Shari’ah’ (Article 22(a)),
and the revised Arab Charter on Human Rights
requires ‘conformity with the fundamental values
of society’ (Article 32(2)). Nor is speech unlimited
under the ICCPR or the ECHR: As any other form
of expression, caricatures may be restricted if they
infringe, inter alia, upon the rights and reputa-
tions of others. Incendiary or racist caricatures are
not protected either: In the case of the ECHR they
may be considered incompatible with the provi-
sions of the Convention (Article 17), and Article 20
ICCPR obliges state parties to prohibit by law any
advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred
that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hos-
tility or violence. This provision was also invoked
when, in the wake of the Danish cartoons, mem-
bers of the Organisation of Islamic Co-operation
(OIC) intensified their e￿orts to introduce new
international norms prohibiting ‘defamation of
religions’.
CASES: Since caricatures have generally been
subsumed under provisions of free speech, the
criteria developed by courts for limiting speech
are also applicable, particularly with regard to
defamation. Under the ECtHR’s categorisation,
caricatures will likely constitute value judgments
Bereitgestellt von | UZH Hauptbibliothek / Zentralbibliothek Zürich
Angemeldet
Heruntergeladen am | 20.12.16 11:08
Caricatures / Cartoons ￿ 99
rather than factual statements; therefore, they
may not require proof but can still be prosecuted
if excessive [PALOMO SÁNCHEZ, 2011]. There is
very limited scope, however, for restrictions if a
caricature is political in nature or expresses views
on questions of public interest [FÉRET, 2007]. The
ECtHR acknowledges that caricatures rely on satir-
ical elements, and that satire is ‘a form of artistic
expression and social commentary and, by its in-
herent features of exaggeration and distortion of
reality, naturally aims to provoke and agitate.’ As
a consequence, the Court examines ‘with par-
ticular care’ interference with an artist’s right
to such expression [VEREINIGUNG BILDENDER
KÜNSTLER, 2007; ERKANLI 2002; LEROY 2008].
Humour, however, does not justify racism or in-
citement [M’BALA M’BALA, 2015], and it may also
be counterbalanced by the protection of morals.
On several occasions, the ECtHR has deemed the
protection of religious feelings a legitimate aim
[e.g. OTTO-PREMINGER-INSTITUT, 1994]. Yet the
ECtHR has not assessed the Danish cartoons on
the merits [BEN EL MAHI, 2006], nor has any
other international body [cf. SAID AHMAD, 2008].
In proceedings before Western national courts,
these caricatures have been protected as legitim-
ate speech on politically relevant matters [DET
ISLAMISKE TROSSAMFUND (2), 2008; VAL, 2008].
In Jordan and Yemen, however, editors who re-
published the cartoons were found guilty under
(religiously inspired) provisions prohibiting de-
faming the Prophet.
VIEWS: The assessment of the Danish cartoons
di￿ered not only in the courts according to jur-
isdiction. There were also significant di￿erences
in their political and scholarly appraisal. When
first published in 2005, the drawings were mostly
criticised by politicians as unnecessarily divisive
and o￿ensive. When violent attacks on publishers
and cartoonists ensued, however, more emphasis
was put on the cartoons as exercise of free speech;
after the attacks on the French satirical Charlie
Hébdo in January 2015, the right to criticise re-
ligion was elevated to a central tenet of public
debate.
In the literature, those critical of the cartoons
highlighted the multicultural aspects of the con-
troversy and saw it as evidence of increasing ‘Is-
lamophobia’ and of lacking acceptance for reli-
gious minorities (Sutcli￿e 2007; Cram 2009; Doeb-
bler 2009). It was also pointed out that previous
case law (especially of the ECtHR) did not rule out
regulation of religiously o￿ensive speech or of a
discriminatory nature (Cerone 2008; Kahn 2011).
Particularly in the context of e￿orts to re-
strict ‘defamation’ of religion, however, most au-
thors have underlined the important role that
caricatures play in public discourse; recourse to
religious norms was considered unsuitable in a
liberal democracy; the conceptual and procedural
di￿culties when protecting religions from insult
would also be considerable (Boyle, 2006; Post,
2007; Bielefeldt, 2012).
CONCL: Caricatures can be considered a (re-
gional) cultural practice that is entitled to protec-
tion, within the legal framework and the limits
established for other forms of expression. This
protection extends to satirical attacks on religious
tenets, which have been an early and continuing
feature of caricature, as illustrated by the third-
century Alexamenos gra￿to in Rome or the anti-
Papal and anti-Lutheran drawings of the Reform-
ation and Counter-Reformation. The controversy
over the Danish cartoons has shown, however,
that there are stark cultural di￿erences with re-
gard to what may be the subject of criticism and
ridicule, particularly with regard to religion.
Yet the OIC’s attempts to establish ‘defama-
tion of religion’ as a new limitation on the inter-
national level of expression in general and satire
in particular have failed. On the contrary, the de-
bate over defamation has led to a clarification –
and fortification – of the protection that carica-
tures and other potentially o￿ensive means of
expression enjoy within the political and soci-
etal discourse, regardless of potential o￿ence to
religions (cf. Venice Commission, 2010; CCPR,
General Comment No. 34 (2011)). Still, the cartoon
controversy has shown that while protection for
cultural rights may well be universal (CESCR, Gen-
eral Comment no. 21 (2009)), in many instances
the objects of such rights clearly are not. The con-
verse legal reactions to the cartoons indicate some
significant di￿erences in legal culture(s). Where
religion continues to provide the main rationale
for a legal order, religious precepts on blasphemy,
sacrilege and even apostasy may require the pro-
hibition of certain caricatures. In a secularised
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legal order, on the other hand, religion may be an
object of protection, yet it does no longer determ-
ine the substance of commands and prohibitions
(Langer, 2013). Under a human rights approach,
the religious sensitivities of the faithful may well
be safeguarded; a religious creed or its prophets,
on the other hand, are not protected.
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Censorship
DEF/HIST: Basically, we could distinguish
between ex-ante censorship (or ‘prior restraint’),
i.e. the suppression of free expressions, including
artistic or media content, before their creation,
presentation or publication, and ex-postmeasures
executed to prevent their exposure to a wider
public. However, in the digital age such distinc-
tions tend to become obsolete, especially due to
the simultaneity of producing and distributing
information and other content on the Internet.
More sense, especially in legal and policy terms,
could make a di￿erentiation between direct (via
a mandated institution, e.g. of the state) or in-
direct censorship, the latter often related to ‘self-
censorship’.
In China, Greece and other ancient societies,
‘censorship was considered a legitimate instru-
ment for regulating the moral and political life
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